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The Austrian school of economics has its beginnings in the publication, in
1871, of Carl Menger’s Principles of Economics, a brilliant demonstration
of the possibility of an economics which would be at one and the same time
truly theoretical (‘exact’) and also subjectivist. Thus the laws of the theory,
laws of economic action and of economic value, are in every case related by
Menger to individual utility, individual perception and individual decision
in such a way as to embrace the recognition that all social phenomena are
the result of human activity, all value the result of individual preference. An
economy is not, from this subjectivist point of view, an autonomous
formation with unintelligible properties of its own (it is not, for example,
the circular flow that one finds represented in the standard textbooks).
Rather, one can understand the workings of an economy. One can see, for
example, how the value of goods at earlier stages in the productive process
is in every case derived from the value to actual consumers of the products
of the later stages.
The phrase ‘Austrian school’ was at first employed as a term of denigration
by opponents of Menger’s ideas, above all by the members of the German
historical school. For in contrast to its more developed neighbours to the
west, Austria at that time could look back on almost no important
theoretical or scientific achievements of her own. Moreover, Austrian
intellectual life was still permeated by an underlying philosophy of
Aristotelianism and scholastic realism, a philosophy which must have
seemed, from the perspective of a forward-looking and enlightened
Germany, with its Kant and its Hegel, merely quaint and old-fashioned.
Paradoxically, however, it was at least in part this Aristotelian background
which enabled Menger to make theoretical advances of a sort which were
ruled out by the narrow inductivism of his German contemporaries. For
Aristotle had insisted that there are qualities, for example, of action or
knowledge or of more complex social phenomena, which are knowable a
from Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophical Background, Wolfgang Grassl 
& Barry Smith (eds.), Croom Helm / 1986, reprinted Routledge Revivals, 2010, vii-x
priori. Such phenomena thereby satisfy laws which do not stand in need of
being inductively established. Menger was thus drawn to seek out such laws
in the economic sphere, setting in train a tradition of research which can
now be seen to have contributed much to our understanding both of the
nature of the economic sphere and of the limits of economic theory.
The first-generation members of the Austrian school, Böhm-Bawerk and
Wieser, were both, like Menger, professors of economics in Vienna, the
latter in particular carrying forward Aristotelian ideas of the sort utilised
earlier by Menger. Austrian economics then took part in that renaissance of
intellectual and cultural life which is so characteristic of fin-de-siècle
Austria. One can point, for example, to the names of Schumpeter, Mises,
Mayer, Schönfeld-Illy, Rosenstein-Rodan, as well as to Austro-Marxists
such as Hilferding and Otto Bauer who were also influenced by the thinking
of Menger. It was above all, however, the circle of thinkers around Ludwig
von Mises who did most to establish the characteristic methods and insights
of the Austrian school—particularly in relation to the now increasingly
influential Austrian theory of the trade circle—and to spread the Austrian
ideas beyond the borders of Austria herself. Mises’ circle included not only
economists such as Hayek, Haberler, Machlup and Morgenstern, but also
philosophers such as Felix Kaufmann and Alfred Schütz. Its influence is
seen, for example, in the work of Lionel Robbins, but also—and more
radically—in the philosophically challenging extreme subjectivism of
G.L.S.Shackle.
Austrian economics in the present day is represented above all by Friedrich
von Hayek, by Ludwig Lachmann, and by Israel Kirzner. Lachmann has
perhaps done more than any other thinker within the Austrian tradition to
push back the limits of subjectivism, particularly in relation to the role that
is played by individual expectations in economic theory. Kirzner, who has
developed and refined many of the ideas of Mises and Hayek on the role of
knowledge and error in economic action, has shown how it is possible to
utilise Misesian ideas on entrepreneurship in a way which has powerful
consequences for economic theory in general and for our understanding of
competition and the market in particular.
Competition, in the Austrian view, is never ‘perfect’. The plans and
expectations of distinct market participants are never even approximately in
harmony with one another. Yet there are manifest benefits of market
competition, benefits of a sort which, as the early Austrians did much to
demonstrate, would seem to be incapable of being simulated by, for
example, a centrally planned economy. How, then, are such benefits to be
understood? Classical economic theory has tackled this problem almost
exclusively by examining the properties of the equilibrium state—a state
which involves perfect harmony of all participants’ plans—and by
demonstrating mathematically why this state, for given—fixed—external
conditions, is preferable to all others. Thus it has paid little attention to the
problem of how the benefits of competition and of the market can be
understood under the actually prevailing circumstances of endemic
imperfection and of constantly changing external conditions. Austrian
economists, in contrast, think not in terms of an ideal state of achieved
equilibrium but rather in terms of a faltering process of always partial
movement towards such an ideal state. Kirzner, in particular, has shown
how it is the perception of disharmonies or of the mismatchings of plans on
the part of individual entrepreneurs that serves as the motor giving rise to a
tendency towards relatively greater harmony, and thereby to the realisation
of economic opportunities hitherto unexploited. But now the entrepreneur’s
task, in a view of this sort, is not, as in the classical (Robbinsian) view, one
of calculation, as if the means and ends of economic activity were already
identified and all that remained would be to fit the one to the other in the
most rational possible way. The entrepreneur rather discovers these very
means and ends themselves—or indeed he brings them into being by a
process of serendipity.
We said that Menger’s recognition of the possibility of an exact or a priori
theory in economics has contributed to our understanding both of the
economic sphere and of the limits of economic theory. In fact, the
consequences of Menger’s work extend much further, showing us the way
to a more adequate understanding of large-scale social formations in
general, both within and without the economic sphere. It is above all Hayek
who has done most to show how we can refine and deepen Menger’s
insights to the point where we can understand—albeit at a level of
generality and of theoretical abstractness which rules out prediction and
quantification—even the ways in which such social formations may
represent the unintended consequences of individual actions, that is, the
consequences of actions directed towards other, quite disparate, ends.
Building on the work of Menger, Hayek has provided a theory of
spontaneous orders in society which has implications for our understanding
not only of economic formations but also of language, law, religion,
politics, morals, and indeed for the subtle inner workings of scientific
theory itself.
The present volume is a detailed treatment of the historical and
philosophical background of the Menger tradition in nineteenth- and
twentieth-century Austria. It puts forward an interrrelated collection of
ideas and theories, from both philosophy and economics, in a way which
will, it is hoped, contribute to future research both on the Austrian
background of the Austrian school and on the wider interplay between
economic value theory on the one hand and general (philosophical) value
theory on the other.
At the centre of the volume is the work on value and on philosophical
method of the Brentano school, and the volume includes a unique study of
the relations between the Austrian theory of values and the new economic
approach to human behaviour propounded by Gary Becker and others in
Chicago. It also includes considerable bibliographical material on general
value theory which it is hoped will be of benefit both to philosophers and to
economists with an interest in the field.
The seeds of the volume were planted at a symposium on ‘Austrian
Economics and Its Philosophical and Historical Background’ which was
held in Graz, Austria, from 27 to 31 July 1980. Of the participants in this
symposium who are not represented here, the editors would like to thank in
particular Professor Israel Kirzner, who is in many ways responsible for the
fact that this volume exists at all, and, for his unfailing encouragement and
guidance, Kenneth S.Templeton Jr. of the Liberty Fund, by which the Graz
symposium was sponsored.
